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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
The case involves the interpretation and application of the term “fresh pursuit,” as
defined by I.C. § 19-705, to the crime of unlawful entry. After a bench trial, the district court
found William Clark guilty of two counts of unlawful entry, a felony offense due solely to a
“fresh pursuit” element. Mr. Clark argues the State presented insufficient evidence to prove this
element beyond a reasonable doubt. The State’s evidence showed, when Mr. Clark fled into two
homes, the officers were pursuing him to execute an arrest warrant. Mr. Clark asserts the fresh
pursuit definition in I.C. § 19-705 does not include an officer’s pursuit to execute a warrant.
Rather, “fresh pursuit” means an officer’s prompt pursuit upon his observation or knowledge of
the suspect’s nearly contemporaneous commission of a suspected felony. As such, the State’s
evidence was insufficient—the officers were not pursuing Mr. Clark for the present commission
of any offense. Therefore, Mr. Clark maintains the district court erred by finding him guilty of
two count of felony unlawful entry, and he respectfully requests this Court vacate his judgment
of conviction.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
The State filed a Criminal Complaint alleging Mr. Clark committed two counts of
unlawful entry during fresh pursuit, a felony, in violation of I.C. § 18-7034(2), one count of
resisting and obstructing an officer, and one count of providing false information to law
enforcement. (R., pp.10–11.) After a preliminary hearing, the magistrate found probable cause
for the offenses and bound Mr. Clark over to district court. (R., pp.20–22.) Consequently, the
State filed an Information charging Mr. Clark with two counts of unlawful entry during fresh
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pursuit, one count of resisting and obstructing, and one count of providing false information.
(R., pp.23–26.) Mr. Clark pled not guilty. (R., pp.27–28.)
After Mr. Clark waived a jury trial, the district court held a one-day bench trial.
(R., pp.38, 40, 46–47.) The facts from the trial are as follows.
Around 10:30 a.m. on January 9, 2019, Officer Drew and Officer Graham responded to a
call from dispatch on a possible robbery at a trailer home in a trailer park. (Tr. Vol. II,1 p.20,
L.1–p.21, L.3, p.68, Ls.3–13.) There were several people in and around the trailer when the
officers arrived, and Officer Drew had responded to calls there in the past. (Tr. Vol. II, p.22,
Ls.13–15, p.70, Ls.12–16.) Mr. Clark was one of the individuals inside the trailer. (Tr. Vol. II,
p.71, L.2.) Officer Graham smelled marijuana on Mr. Clark and did a pat down for weapons.
(Tr. Vol. II, p.71, Ls.2–5.) He did not find any weapons, and there was no evidence of any
marijuana in Mr. Clark’s possession. (Tr. Vol. II, p.94, Ls.19–21; see Tr. Vol. II, p.66, L.4–p.97,
L.7 (Officer Graham’s testimony).) Officer Graham then went to go speak with another
individual at the scene. (Tr. Vol. II, p.71, Ls.5–6.)
A few minutes later, Officer Drew radioed dispatch with Mr. Clark’s name and date of
birth. (Tr. Vol. II, p.24, L.15–p.25, L.2, p.25, L.24–p.26, L.6.) Officer Graham heard Officer
Drew relay this information and “immediately” recognized Mr. Clark’s name as “someone who I
had been briefed had a warrant for his arrest and had officer safety concerns.” (Tr. Vol. II, p.71,
Ls.7–9.) To this end, about one week prior, Officer Graham’s supervisor had informed him that
Mr. Clark had a felony arrest warrant. (Tr. Vol. II, p.73, L.3–p.75, L.18.) Officer Graham also
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There are two transcripts on appeal contained in one electronic file titled “Appeal Volume 1Transcripts.pdf.” The first transcript, cited as Volume I, contains the verdict hearing, held on
May 10, 2019 (pages 1 to 16 of the overall document). The second transcript, cited as Volume II,
contains a motion hearing, held on April 22, 2019, the court trial, held on May 8, 2019, and the
sentencing hearing, held on July 8, 2019 (pages 17 to 170 of the overall document).
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had confirmed the existence of the warrant in a national law enforcement database. (Tr. Vol. II,
p.75, L.19–p.77, L12.) Officer Graham understood charges were felony malicious harassment
and misdemeanor battery arising in a different county. (Tr. Vol. II, p.77, Ls.16–19.)
Upon his recollection of the arrest warrant, Officer Graham attempted to arrest Mr. Clark,
but Mr. Clark fled. (Tr. Vol. II, p.29, Ls.9–11, p.29, L.21–p.30, L.2, p.79, Ls.11–15.) Right
before or after Mr. Clark’s flight, dispatch informed both officers that Mr. Clark had an active
felony arrest warrant. (Tr. Vol. II, p.24, Ls.3–5, p.48, Ls.7–15, p.87, Ls.10–12.) Officer Drew
and Officer Graham chased after Mr. Clark. (See Tr. Vol. II, p.31, L.6–p.32, L.6, p.32, L.24–
p.33, L.17, p.79, L.16–p.80, L.16.) Officer Drew and Officer Graham both testified that
Mr. Clark’s flight hindered or delayed their robbery investigation. (Tr. Vol. II, p.33, L.18–p.34,
L.6, p.82, L.21–p.83, L.1.)
During Mr. Clark’s flight, he hid in two other trailers. In the first trailer, the owner woke
up while Mr. Clark was attempting to hide, and she kicked him out. (Tr. Vol. II, p.50, L.s7–8,
p.52, L.9–p.53, L.24.) As Mr. Clark was leaving, the owner saw him run towards another trailer,
owned by other members of her family. (Tr. Vol. II, p.55, Ls.1–13, p.59, L.23–p.60, L.1, p.60,
Ls.10–11.) The officers found Mr. Clark hiding in that second trailer and arrested him on the
warrant. (Tr. Vol. II, p.34, Ls.7–23, p.80, Ls.17–18, p.81, L.12–p.82, L.4, p.82, Ls.9–11, p.87,
Ls.2–15.) Both trailer owners denied giving Mr. Clark permission to be in their homes. (Tr. Vol.
II, p.54, Ls.18–20, p.60, L.25–p.61, L.3, p.64, Ls.1–3.)
After the officers arrested Mr. Clark, Officer Graham obtained confirmation of the
warrant. (Tr. Vol. II, p.88, Ls.5–22.) The warrant was a bench warrant for Mr. Clark’s arrest for
his failure to appear at a preliminary conference for charges of malicious harassment, a felony,
and battery, a misdemeanor, in Nez Perce County. (State’s Ex. 3.) The judge had issued the
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bench warrant on November 20, 2018. (State’s Ex. 3, p.1.) Officer Drew’s and Officer Graham’s
body cam videos showed their initial interactions with Mr. Clark, Officer Graham’s attempt to
arrest him, Mr. Clark’s flight, and the officers’ eventual discovery of Mr. Clark in the second
trailer. (See State’s Exs.1, 2.)
In closing arguments, the State argued the district court should find Mr. Clark guilty of
all three offenses. On the two counts of unlawful entry during fresh pursuit, the State asserted the
statutory definition of “fresh pursuit” included pursuit upon an officer’s knowledge of an arrest
warrant. (Tr. Vol. II, p.112, L.17–p.113, L.17.) In contrast, Mr. Clark argued an officer’s pursuit
on an arrest warrant did not qualify as “fresh pursuit.” (Tr. Vol. II, p.118, L.11–p.119, L.24.)
After closing arguments, the district court announced its verdict. (See Tr. Vol. II, p.125,
L.3–p.128, L.14.) First, the district court found Mr. Clark not guilty of providing false
information and acquitted him of that charge. (Tr. Vol. II, p.125, L.15–p.126, L.1.) Second, the
district court found Mr. Clark guilty of resisting and obstructing a police officer. (Tr. Vol. II,
p.126, L.1–p.127, L.4.) The district court explained, however, it did not find Mr. Clark guilty of
this offense for resisting and obstructing “a purported action for what has been referred to as a
robbery in this matter,” contrary to the officers’ testimony and the State’s argument. (Tr. Vol. II,
p.126, L.13–p.127, L.1.) Rather, the district court found Mr. Clark resisted and obstructed by
delaying “the officer’s duty to apprehend individuals with outstanding warrants.” (Tr. Vol. II,
p.126, Ls.16–17.) The district court reasoned that Mr. Clark “in running from the officers once
the officer determined that a warrant was outstanding” constituted resisting and obstructing the
officer’s duty to execute a warrant from a different county. (Tr. Vol. II, p.126, Ls.17–23, see also
Tr. Vol. II, p.127, Ls.2–4.)
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Lastly, the district court addressed the two counts of unlawful entry during fresh pursuit.
(Tr. Vol. II, p.127, L.4–p.128, L.12.) The district court found, on both counts, Mr. Clark entered
the trailers without consent. (Tr. Vol. II, p.127, L.14–p.128, L.2.) The district court recognized
these findings would satisfy the elements for misdemeanor unlawful entry. (Tr. Vol. II, p.128,
Ls.2–5.) On the fresh pursuit element, which elevates the offense to a felony, the district court
took the matter under advisement to determine whether it was “applicable in this case.” (Tr. Vol.
II, p.128, Ls.5–12.) At the next hearing, the district court found “the requisite proof was present
to meet the elements of fresh pursuit” and, therefore, Mr. Clark was guilty of two counts of
unlawful entry during fresh pursuit. (Tr. Vol. I, p.5, L.18–p.6, L.21; see also R., p.48.) The
district court did not provide any explanation on its interpretation of “fresh pursuit” and its
application to this case. (See Tr. Vol. I, p.5, L.9–p.6, L.23.)
At sentencing, the district court commuted Mr. Clark’s sentences for unlawful entry
during fresh pursuit to eight months in county jail, to be served concurrently. (Tr. Vol. II, p.152,
Ls.2–8; R., p.50.) Shortly thereafter, the district court entered a judgment of conviction for two
counts of unlawful entry during fresh pursuit. (R., pp.51–57.) The next day, the district court
granted the State’s motion to dismiss the resisting and obstructing count. (R., pp.59, 60.)
Mr. Clark timely appealed from the district court’s judgment of conviction. (R., pp.64–66.)

5

ISSUE
Did the district court err by finding Mr. Clark guilty of unlawful entry during fresh pursuit
because the officers’ pursuit of Mr. Clark to execute an arrest warrant does not qualify as “fresh
pursuit” as defined by I.C. § 19-705?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred By Finding Mr. Clark Guilty Of Unlawful Entry During Fresh Pursuit
Because The Officers’ Pursuit Of Mr. Clark To Execute An Arrest Warrant Does Not Qualify As
“Fresh Pursuit” As Defined By I.C. § 19-705
A.

Introduction
Mr. Clark challenges the district court’s guilty verdict for two counts of unlawful entry

during fresh pursuit. He argues the statutory definition of “fresh pursuit” in I.C. § 19-705 does
not include a police officer’s pursuit of an individual to execute an arrest warrant. The statute’s
plain language, the Uniform Act on Fresh Pursuit, the legislative history for unlawful entry and
fresh pursuit, and public policy support this interpretation. Because the meaning of “fresh
pursuit” excludes pursuit to execute a warrant, the State presented insufficient evidence to satisfy
the fresh pursuit element—the sole element that elevates unlawful entry from a misdemeanor to a
felony. Therefore, the district court erred by finding Mr. Clark guilty, and this Court should
vacate his judgment of conviction.

B.

Standard Of Review
The Court exercises “free review over statutory interpretation because it is a question of

law.” State v. Owens, 158 Idaho 1, 3 (2015).
“This Court will not overturn a judgment of conviction, entered upon a
jury verdict, where there is substantial evidence upon which a reasonable trier of
fact could have found that the prosecution sustained its burden of proving the
essential elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Sheahan, 139
Idaho 267, 285 (2003). “Evidence is substantial if a reasonable trier of fact would
accept it and rely upon it in determining whether a disputed point of fact has been
proven.” State v. Eliasen, 158 Idaho 542, 546 (2015). A conviction can be based
primarily upon circumstantial evidence, State v. Stevens, 93 Idaho 48, 50–51
(1969), and “even when circumstantial evidence could be interpreted consistently
with a finding of innocence, it will be sufficient to uphold a guilty verdict when it
also gives rise to reasonable inferences of guilt,” Severson, 147 Idaho at 712.
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State v. Smith, 161 Idaho 782, 790 (2017). The Court views “the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prosecution.” Eliasen, 158 Idaho at 546 (quoting State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho
445, 460 (2012)).

C.

The State Presented Insufficient Evidence For The District Court To Find Mr. Clark
Guilty Of Unlawful Entry During Fresh Pursuit Because Pursuit To Execute An Arrest
Warrant Is Not “Fresh Pursuit” As Defined By I.C. § 19-705
Mr. Clark contends the State failed to meet its burden to prove him guilty of two counts

of unlawful entry, a felony by virtue of the officers’ alleged fresh pursuit, because the statutory
definition of “fresh pursuit” excludes pursuit to execute an outstanding warrant for an
individual’s arrest. First, he argues the statute’s plain language clearly defines fresh pursuit as an
officer’s pursuit of person who has committed a crime shortly after the officer observes or learns
of the crime’s commission. It excludes pursuit of persons with outstanding arrest warrants.
Second, if the fresh pursuit statute is ambiguous, Mr. Clark argues the rules of statutory
construction all point to an interpretation that excludes pursuit to execute an arrest warrant. As
such, without any evidence of Officer Drew and Officer Graham’s “fresh pursuit” of Mr. Clark,
the State presented insufficient evidence to find Mr. Clark guilty of unlawful entry during fresh
pursuit.

1.

The plain language of the “fresh pursuit” definition in I.C. § 19-705 does not
include an officer’s pursuit to execute an arrest warrant

Idaho Code § 18-7034 criminalizes unlawful entry—a person’s entry into a home or other
structure without the owner’s consent. I.C. § 18-7034. The statute contains a misdemeanor and
felony section. The misdemeanor section states:
Every person, except under landlord-tenant relationship, who enters any dwelling
house, apartment, tenement, shop, warehouse, store, mill, barn, stable, outhouse
or other building, tent, vessel, closed vehicle, closed trailer, airplane, railroad car
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or outbuilding, without the consent of the owner of such property or his agent or
any person in lawful possession thereof, is guilty of a misdemeanor.
I.C. § 18-7034(1). The second section elevates this offense to a felony if the unlawful entry
occurs during fresh pursuit:
Any person who enters any permanent or temporary dwelling without the consent
of the owner of such property or his agent or any person in lawful possession
thereof while being pursued by a peace officer is guilty of a felony. For purposes
of this subsection “pursued” means “fresh pursuit” as defined in section 19-705,
Idaho Code.
I.C. § 18-7034(2) (emphasis added). The State charged Mr. Clark with this felony offense
because, at the time of his entry into the two trailers, Officer Drew and Officer Graham were
pursing him to execute an arrest warrant out of Nez Perce County for Mr. Clark’s failure to
appear at hearing for a criminal case. (R., pp.23–24; State’s Ex. 3; Tr. Vol. II, p.112, L.17–p.113,
L.17 (State’s closing argument).)
As indicated in I.C. § 18-7034(2), the legislature adopted the “fresh pursuit” definition in
I.C. § 19-705 to define “pursued” for felony unlawful entry. Idaho Code § 19-705 states in full:
The term “fresh pursuit” as used in this act2 shall include fresh pursuit as
defined by the common law, and also the pursuit of a person who has committed a
felony or who is reasonably suspected of having committed a felony. It shall also
include the pursuit of a person suspected of having committed a supposed felony,
though no felony has actually been committed, if there is reasonable ground for
believing that a felony has been committed. Fresh pursuit as used herein shall not
necessarily imply instant pursuit, but pursuit without unreasonable delay.
I.C. § 19-705. Accordingly, fresh pursuit includes two types: (1) common law fresh pursuit and
(2) pursuit of a person who has committed or reasonably suspected to have committed a felony.

2

This act is the Uniform Act on Fresh Pursuit. I.C. § 19-707. This act discussed in detail in Part
C.2.
9

No Idaho appellate court has interpreted the second part of the fresh pursuit definition,
but the Court of Appeals has outlined the elements of common law fresh pursuit. The common
law elements are:
(1) whether the police acted without unnecessary delay; (2) whether the pursuit
was continuous and uninterrupted, even if surveillance or knowledge of the
suspect’s location was interrupted; and (3) whether a close temporal relationship
existed between the commission of the offense, the commencement of the pursuit,
and the apprehension of the suspect.
State v. Scott, 150 Idaho 123, 125 (Ct. App. 2010) (citing cases from other jurisdictions). The
common law elements plainly exclude pursuit to execute an arrest warrant. Pursuit to execute a
warrant would fail element 3 of a close temporal relationship between the suspect’s commission
of the offense, the start of the pursuit, and the officer’s apprehension of the suspect. Indeed, the
Scott Court recognized, under the common law, “[a]ll that appears to be required . . . is that the
officer had knowledge that a crime or infraction was committed within the jurisdiction and the
officer pursued the suspect beyond the jurisdiction3 with the purpose of making an arrest, citing
the suspect, or investigating the offense.” 150 Idaho at 126. Scott did not address the second part
of the fresh pursuit definition.4 See id. at 124–26.
Nonetheless, by its plain language, this second part of the fresh pursuit definition also
excludes pursuit to execute an arrest warrant. “Statutory interpretation begins with the statute’s
plain language. That language is to be given its plain, obvious and rational meaning. If that
language is clear and unambiguous, the Court need merely apply the statute without engaging in
any statutory construction.” State v. Brand, 162 Idaho 189, 191 (2017) (citations and internal
3

The Uniform Act on Fresh Pursuit and an officer’s authority to pursue a suspect outside his
jurisdiction is discussed in Part C.2.
4
The issue in Scott was whether the officer was in fresh pursuit of the defendant for speeding
after the defendant drove outside the officer’s city jurisdiction. See id. at 124–26. The second
part of fresh pursuit was inapplicable because speeding is a traffic infraction, not a felony. Id. at
125–26.
10

quotation marks omitted). “Provisions should not be read in isolation, but rather within the
context of the entire document . . . The Court must give effect to all the words in the statute so
that none will be void or superfluous.” State v. Smalley, 164 Idaho 780, 784 (2019). “To
ascertain the ordinary meaning of an undefined term in a statute, [this Court has] often turned to
dictionary definitions of the term.” Marek v. Hecla, Ltd., 161 Idaho 211, 216 (2016) (quoting
Arnold v. City of Stanley, 158 Idaho 218, 221 (2015)). Here, this second part of fresh pursuit is
“pursuit without unreasonable delay” of a person “who has committed a felony” or “is
reasonably suspected of having committed a felony,” even if “no felony has actually been
committed.” I.C. § 19-705. In light of this language, the question is whether the “committed a
felony” means present commission only, such as an officer’s observation of a felony and prompt
pursuit of the fleeing perpetrator, or if this language incorporates past commission of a felony,
such as an arrest warrant or even a prior felony conviction. The plain language indicates the
legislature intended to exclude the commission of past felonies from “fresh pursuit.”
First, the legislature’s use of the word “committed” refers to the present commission of a
suspected felony. The legislature did not include fresh pursuit of a person “charged” with or
“convicted” of a felony. “Committed” denotes the act itself, before the start of criminal
proceedings. Black’s Law Dictionary defines “commit” as “to perpetrate (a crime).” Commit,
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). Similarly, Merriam-Webster’s defines “commit” as
“to carry into action: perpetrate,” and Webster’s defines it as “do, perform.” THE MERRIAMWEBSTER DICTIONARY 144 (2016); WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 457
(2002);

see

also

Commit,

MERRIAM-WEBSTER

ONLINE

DICTIONARY,

available

at

https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/commit (“to carry into action deliberately:
perpetrate”) (last visited Mar. 17, 2020). Thus, the reference to a person “who has committed” a
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suspected felony plainly denotes a present action or perpetration of the offense. This language
excludes a previously charged offense resulting in an outstanding arrest warrant.
Second, the remaining language in the definition confirms the legislature’s intent to
exclude fresh pursuit to execute an arrest warrant. The plain language twice references an
officer’s reasonable suspicion of a felony—fresh pursuit occurs when an officer “reasonably
suspect[s]” or has “reasonable ground” to believe the suspect committed a felony offense.
I.C. § 19-705. Moreover, an officer lawfully engages in fresh pursuit even if no felony “has
actually been committed,” as long as the officer’s belief was reasonable. This language must
signify pursuit before the issuance of an arrest warrant because, if an arrest warrant was pending,
the officer would have more than reasonable suspicion of a felony. Depending the basis for the
arrest warrant, an officer would have at least probable cause and at most a finding of guilt for the
offense. The statute’s language on the officer’s reasonable suspicion of the offense would be
rendered superfluous if an officer could engage in fresh pursuit to execute an arrest warrant.
Further, the plain language references “not necessarily . . . instant pursuit, but pursuit without
unreasonable delay.” I.C. § 19-705. Again, this language must signify pursuit before the issuance
of a warrant—the very nature of an outstanding warrant means there will always be delay prior
to the execution of that warrant. The requirement of prompt pursuit plainly limits the timeframe
of pursuit to shortly after the suspect’s actual commission of the offense. This language would
also rendered superfluous if an officer could engage in “fresh pursuit” in the days, weeks, or
months after the commission of the offense to execute a warrant. Therefore, these definitional
phrases, along with the “committed” language, exclude pursuit to execute an arrest warrant and,
instead, require pursuit close-in-time to the suspect’s actual commission of the suspected felony.
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In sum, the second part of “fresh pursuit” definition is clear and unambiguous. Its rational
meaning is to define fresh pursuit as an officer’s instantaneous or reasonably prompt pursuit of a
suspect upon the officer’s observation or knowledge of the suspect’s nearly contemporaneous
commission of a suspected felony. In other words, it requires “fresh” pursuit of a suspect who
just committed a crime, as opposed to “stale” pursuit on a past offense. As such, this definition
excludes an officer’s pursuit to execute a pre-existing arrest warrant.

2.

If the “fresh pursuit” definition is ambiguous, the rules of statutory construction
confirm its exclusion of an officer’s pursuit to execute an arrest warrant

If the second part of the fresh pursuit definition is ambiguous, the rules of statutory
construction make the legislative intent behind its definition abundantly clear. When the
legislature adopted the Uniform Act on Fresh Pursuit in 1941, and again when the legislature
adopted the felony unlawful entry section in 2017, the legislature intended “fresh pursuit” to
exclude execution of arrest warrants. Moreover, public policy on the necessary limitations of the
fresh pursuit doctrine verify this interpretation.
When this Court must engage in statutory construction because an
ambiguity exists, it has the duty to ascertain the legislative intent and give effect
to that intent. To ascertain such intent, not only must the literal words of the
statute be examined, but also the context of those words, the public policy behind
the statute and its legislative history. It is incumbent upon a court to give an
ambiguous statute an interpretation which will not render it a nullity.
Constructions of an ambiguous statute that would lead to an absurd result are
disfavored.
State v. Coleman, 163 Idaho 671, 674 (Ct. App. 2018) (citations omitted).
First, the Uniform Act on Fresh Pursuit provides valuable insight on the legislature’s
intent on the meaning of “fresh pursuit.” In 1935, state and federal representatives formed the
Interstate Commission on Crime to “to discuss ways and means of overcoming loopholes in the
criminal laws which worked to the advantage of the criminal and against the interests of society.”
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THE INTERSTATE COMMISSION

ON

CRIME, THE HANDBOOK ON INTERSTATE CRIME CONTROL 12

(4th ed. 1942).5 One of those loopholes was “criminals . . . utilizing state lines to handicap our
police in their apprehension.” Id. at 16. The Commission explained:
At the present time our most desperate criminals head straight across state lines
after the commission of a crime, knowing that there is comparative safety beyond
the border. For in the foreign state the pursuing officer from the state wherein the
crime was committed is, in general, no longer an officer.
Id. To remedy this “abnormality,” the Commission drafted the Uniform Act on Fresh Pursuit. Id.
Under this Act,
the moment an officer in fresh pursuit of a criminal crosses a state line, the state
he enters will authorize him to catch and arrest such criminal within its bounds.
The statute grants this right only when the officer is in fresh pursuit of a criminal,
that is, pursuit without unreasonable delay, by a member of a duly organized
peace unit, and only in cases of felonies or supposed felonies occurring outside
the boundaries of the state adopting the act. It is thus based upon the little-known
common-law doctrine of fresh pursuit, from which the statute has derived its
name.
Id. The common law doctrine of fresh pursuit originated from a warrantless arrest “by hue and
cry,” “the old common-law process” of chasing suspects “immediately upon robberies and
felonies committed” from town to town “with horn and voice” until “they be taken and delivered
to the sheriff.” Id. at 19. This “hue and cry” doctrine evolved to permit an officer or private
person to arrest “without a warrant” upon immediate pursuit of a person who committed a felony
and fled. Id. at 19–20 (discussing legal authorities). Although this fresh pursuit doctrine “was
known to the common law,” the Commission explained there was “great contrariety” in the
states with the common law doctrine. Id. at 20. And, the Commission noted, many officers had
no knowledge of their state’s common law doctrine. Id. Therefore, the Act would preserve each
state’s fresh pursuit under its common law while adding a uniform fresh pursuit doctrine, also
5

This book is available online through
https://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.39015028062191.
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based on the common law, to apply to all states. Id. See also Che Odom, Police Violate Due
Process Rights by Crossing State Borders and Ignoring Fresh-Pursuit Laws, 36 NEW ENG. J. ON
CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 319, 321–22 (2010) (footnotes omitted) (“A state does not have
authority to extend its police power or its criminal law into another state. This means that, as a
rule, officers of one state cannot make arrests in another, but exceptions exist. Officers are
permitted to arrest a suspect after a chase into another state if such authority has been granted by
that other state at common law or by enactment of the Uniform Act on Fresh Pursuit.”); see also
Judith V. Royster & Rory SnowArrow Fausett, Fresh Pursuit Onto Native American
Reservations: State Rights “To Pursue Savage Hostile Indian Marauders Across the Border,” 59
U. COLO. L. REV. 191, 249–51 (1988) (discussing interstate fresh pursuit). By 1955, thirty-nine
states had adopted the Commission’s Act. THE COUNCIL

OF

STATE GOVERNMENTS, THE

HANDBOOK ON INTERSTATE CRIME CONTROL ii, 3–4 (Rev. ed. 1955).6 See also Arrest without a
Warrant, 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE § 5.1(b) (5th ed. Oct. 2019 update) (text
accompanying footnotes 82 to 87); 2 LAFAVE, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 3.5(a) (4th ed. Dec. 2019
update) (text accompanying footnotes 23 to 27)
The Act itself contained nine sections, and Idaho adopted it in full in 1941. THE
INTERSTATE COMMISSION ON CRIME, THE HANDBOOK ON INTERSTATE CRIME CONTROL at 18; see
also Ch. 69, 1941 Idaho Sess. Laws at 133–34. Idaho’s Act is codified in Chapter 7 of Title 19.
See I.C. §§ 19-701 to -707. The first section allows any officer from another state to enter Idaho
in “fresh pursuit” to arrest the person “on the ground that he is believed to have committed a
felony in such other state,” and it gives the out-of-state officer the same authority to arrest and
detain as an Idaho officer. I.C. § 19-701. This section mirrors the Commission’s Act and has
6

This book is also available online through the HathiTrust Digital Library at
https://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc1.b3270990.
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been unchanged since 1941. See Ch. 69, § 1, 1941 Idaho Sess. Laws at 133. The second section,
I.C. § 19-701A, outlines the authority of Idaho officers in fresh pursuit. Notably, it gives Idaho
officers broader authority than out-of-state officers in fresh pursuit. It states in part:
Any peace officer of this state in fresh pursuit of a person who is reasonably
believed by him to have committed a felony in this state or has committed, or
attempted to commit, any criminal offense or traffic infraction in this state in the
presence of such officer, or for whom a warrant of arrest is outstanding for a
criminal offense, shall have authority to pursue, arrest and hold in custody or cite
such person anywhere in this state.
I.C. § 19-701A (emphasis added). The legislature enacted this section in 1980, and it mirrors
another proposed law by the Commission on intrastate pursuit.7 Ch. 152, § 1, 1980 Idaho Sess.
Laws at 322; see THE INTERSTATE COMMISSION

ON

CRIME, THE HANDBOOK

ON INTERSTATE

CRIME CONTROL at 31 (Section 1 of the Uniform Act of Instra-State Fresh Pursuit of Criminals).
This section’s language, quoted above, has been unchanged (except in 1987 when the legislature
added pursuit for traffic infractions.) Ch. 85, § 2, 1987 Idaho Sess. Laws at 160–61. The last
relevant section, section 5, contains the definition of fresh pursuit. Ch. 69, § 5, 1941 Idaho Sess.
Laws at 133–34. Again, I.C. § 19-705 reads in full:
The term “fresh pursuit” as used in this act shall include fresh pursuit as
defined by the common law, and also the pursuit of a person who has committed a
felony or who is reasonably suspected of having committed a felony. It shall also
include the pursuit of a person suspected of having committed a supposed felony,
though no felony has actually been committed, if there is reasonable ground for
believing that a felony has been committed. Fresh pursuit as used herein shall not
necessarily imply instant pursuit, but pursuit without unreasonable delay.

7

The legislature had adopted a different version of intrastate pursuit in 1941. At that time, the
legislature added intrastate pursuit into an existing statute on “powers of policemen.” 1941 Idaho
Sess. Laws 132. This section was first codified at I.C. § 49-331, but recodifed at I.C. § 50-209 in
1967. Ch. 429, § 73, 1967 Idaho Sess. Laws at 1249–50, 1273. Eventually, in 1980, the
legislature added Commission’s proposed intrastate pursuit law as a new section, codified as
I.C. § 19-701A, and reworded I.C. § 50-209 on police powers to refer back to Idaho’s fresh
pursuit laws in Title 19, Chapter 7. Ch. 152, § 2, 1980 Idaho Sess. Laws at 322–23.
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I.C. § 19-705. As intended, this definition kept Idaho’s common law on fresh pursuit intact,
while also including a uniform definition to apply across state lines. Idaho’s definition is
identical to the Commission’s proposed definition, and it has not been changed since its
enactment in 1941. Compare I.C. § 19-705, with THE INTERSTATE COMMISSION ON CRIME, THE
HANDBOOK ON INTERSTATE CRIME CONTROL at 17.
The upshot of this legislative history is simple—the Act’s meaning of “fresh pursuit” did
not include pursuit to execute a warrant. This is evident from the Commission’s discussion on
the Act’s purpose and the evolution of the common law fresh pursuit doctrine. Throughout the
Commission’s discussion, there is no mention of “fresh pursuit” to execute an arrest warrant. The
Act further demonstrates that the concepts of fresh pursuit and execution of an arrest warrant are
mutually exclusive. That is because “it is a well-established principle of law that a warrant from
one state has no force or validity outside the boundaries of that state.” State v. Bradley, 106
Idaho 358, 360 (1983). If the Act also intended to remedy this jurisdictional limitation, it would
have said so. There would have been a vastly different definition of “fresh pursuit” and a vastly
different law on the authority of interstate officers. The legislative history of this Act shows the
legislature did not intend to define “fresh pursuit” as pursuit to execute an arrest warrant.
Also in support of this division between fresh pursuit and arrest warrants is Idaho’s
broader grant of authority to intrastate officers. As explored above, I.C. § 19-701A allows an
Idaho officer to engage in “fresh pursuit” throughout the state without losing his city, county, or
other territorial authority. However, I.C. § 19-701A also grants an Idaho officer the authority to
pursue a person “for whom a warrant of arrest is outstanding for a criminal offense.” I.C. § 19701A. This provision on outstanding arrest warrants is wholly absent from the first section on
interstate officer pursuit in I.C. § 19-701. This means that the legislature understood, and
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rightfully so, that the authority to pursue for a warrant was not included in the existing definition
of “fresh pursuit.” The legislature found it necessary to add a specific provision to allow for an
Idaho officer’s pursuit to execute a warrant within the state. The comparison of these two
sections—interstate pursuit in I.C. § 19-701 and intrastate pursuit in I.C. § 19-701A—again
confirms the statutory meaning of “fresh pursuit” to exclude pursuit to execute an arrest warrant.
Next, the legislature history on unlawful entry confirms the legislature’s intent on the
definition of fresh pursuit. Prior to 2017, unlawful entry was a misdemeanor offense only. See
I.C. § 18-7034 (2016). Then, in 2017, a state senator introduced a bill to elevate the offense from
a misdemeanor to a felony if “the person is being pursued by law enforcement officials.” S.B.
1093, 64th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2017), available at https://legislature.idaho.gov/wpcontent/uploads/sessioninfo/2017/legislation/S1093.pdf. In the Senate Judiciary and Rules
Committee meeting, the senator was specifically asked if “having an arrest warrant pending
would be considered being pursued by law enforcement” under the proposed statute. S.B. 1093,
S. Jud. & Rules Comm. Minutes, 64th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess., at 2 (Idaho Mar. 1, 2017). The
senator responded that no, “it would be not be considered being pursued, but being sought by law
enforcement.” Id. See also S.B. 1093, S. Jud. & Rules Comm. Audio, 64th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess.,
at 12:38–13:17 (Idaho Mar. 1, 2017) (senator responding “no,” “‘pursued’ is something
different” than being “wanted” or “sought,” and he had discussed that distinction with “various
attorneys”). After the bill was passed in the senate, the House Judiciary, Rules, and
Administration Committee had similar concerns. S.B. 1093, H. Jud., Rules, & Admin. Comm.
Minutes, 64th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess., at 1 (Idaho Mar. 21, 2017); see also S.B. 1093, H. Jud.,
Rules, & Admin. Comm. Video, 64th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess., at 1:02–21:54 (Idaho Mar. 21, 2017).
The video recording of the committee meeting shows, among other questions, one representative
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asked about the meaning of “pursued,” and the senator responded that a warrant would not
qualify. S.B. 1093, H. Jud., Rules, & Admin. Comm. Video, 64th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess., at 10:35–
11:36 (Idaho Mar. 21, 2017). In light of a missing definition for “pursued,” and other issues with
the scope of the bill, the committee agreed to send the bill to general orders. S.B. 1093, H. Jud.,
Rules, & Admin. Comm. Minutes, 64th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess., at 1 (Idaho Mar. 21, 2017); also
S.B. 1093, H. Jud., Rules, & Admin. Comm. Video, 64th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess., at 20:30–23:44
(Idaho Mar. 21, 2017). The same day, the bill was amended to adopt the definition of “fresh
pursuit” in I.C. § 19-705 and to change “law enforcement officials” to “a peace officer.” See S.B.
1093,

H.

Amendment,

64th

Legis.,

1st

Reg.

Sess.

(Idaho

2017),

available

at

https://legislature.idaho.gov/wp-content/uploads/sessioninfo/2017/legislation/S1093A1.pdf. The
amended bill also pared down the extensive list of structures in the misdemeanor provision to a
“permanent or temporary dwelling” only for a felony. Id.; compare I.C. § 19-705(1) (“any
dwelling house, apartment, tenement, shop, warehouse, store, mill, barn, stable, outhouse or
other building, tent, vessel, closed vehicle, closed trailer, airplane, railroad car or outbuilding”),
with I.C. § 19-705(2) (“any permanent or temporary dwelling”). Shortly thereafter, both houses
passed

the

amended

bill.

See

S.B.

1093,

2017

Legislation,

https://legislature.idaho.gov/sessioninfo/2017/legislation/S1093/. The Statement of Purpose
explained: “This bill raises unlawful entries committed while the offender is fleeing from the
police to a felony. The bill would also clarify that the victim can recover restitution. 8” Statement
of Purpose, RS25234, S.B. 1093, 64th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2017). The Fiscal Note

8

The second purpose on restitution was abandoned when the bill was amended to include the
“fresh pursuit” definition. Compare S.B. 1093, 64th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2017), available
at https://legislature.idaho.gov/wp-content/uploads/sessioninfo/2017/legislation/S1093.pdf, with
House Amendment to S.B. 1093, 64th Legis., 1st Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2017), available at
https://legislature.idaho.gov/wp-content/uploads/sessioninfo/2017/legislation/S1093A1.pdf.
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indicated: “There is likely to be minimal fiscal impact to the General Fund, as well as to
counties. This type of unlawful entry does not occur often, but does occur enough that there is a
potential for incarceration of one or more individuals in some years.” Id.
This legislative history verifies the legislature’s intent to exclude pursuit to execute an
arrest warrant from the definition of fresh pursuit. In response to concerns about the reach of this
bill, the sponsoring senator informed both the senate and the house that “pursued” would not
include warrants. Nevertheless, the house still had concerns, and it did not pass the bill until it
included a definition of “pursued.” Since the chosen definition for “pursued” was “fresh pursuit”
in I.C. § 19-705, it follows that the legislature understood this definition not to include pursuit to
execute an arrest warrant. This narrower view of “fresh pursuit” is consistent with the house’s
overall goal in amending the proposed bill to limit the felony provision. Therefore, this
legislative history establishes the legislature’s intent to elevate unlawful entry from misdemeanor
to a felony in limited situations where an officer chases after a suspect who had just committed a
suspected felony.
Finally, public policy considerations support an interpretation of “fresh pursuit” that
excludes the execution of arrest warrants. If the Court declines to adopt a narrow interpretation,
the felony unlawful entry offense would extend far beyond the legislature’s intent. With a broad
interpretation, it is foreseeable that the State would bring felony unlawful entry charges against
any person with a prior felony conviction because that person has “committed a felony.” I.C. §
19-705. Although that interpretation would be inconsistent with the statute’s plain language, and
contrary to the rules of statutory construction, that position is at least feasible. This
interpretation, however, would lead to a great expansion of the number of felony unlawful entry
charges. Any person with a prior felony conviction, even if it occurred years ago, would be
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subject to a felony for unlawful entry. This immensely broadens the scope of the statute and
seems contrary to the legislature’s fiscal note of a “minimal” impact with very few cases.
In summary, the Court should interpret “fresh pursuit” how the legislature intended it in
1941 when adopting the Uniform Act on Fresh Pursuit and again in 2017 when adopting the
felony unlawful entry provision. The legislative history of these statutes, and reading them in
context, leads to an interpretation of “fresh pursuit” that requires an officer’s prompt pursuit
upon the present commission of a suspected felony. The interpretation should not include a
pursuit to execute an outstanding arrest warrant.

3.

The State’s evidence was insufficient for the district court to find the “fresh
pursuit” element of unlawful entry during fresh pursuit because Mr. Clark’s entry
in the trailers occurred during the officers’ pursuit to execute an arrest warrant

In light of the statutory meaning of “fresh pursuit,” the State presented insufficient
evidence to prove Officer Drew and Officer Graham were in “fresh pursuit” of Mr. Clark when
he unlawfully entered the two trailers. The officers were not pursuing him upon their observation
or knowledge of Mr. Clark’s nearly contemporaneous commission of a suspected felony. Rather,
the officers were pursing him to execute an arrest warrant. Due to the insufficient evidence to
prove the “fresh pursuit” element, this Court should vacate Mr. Clark’s judgment of conviction.
First, the State’s evidence failed to meet the “as defined by the common law” part of the
fresh pursuit definition. See I.C. § 19-705. Again, the common law requires (1) the police to act
without unnecessary delay; (2) a continuous and uninterrupted pursuit; and (3) “a close temporal
relationship existed between the commission of the offense, the commencement of the pursuit,
and the apprehension of the suspect.” Scott, 150 Idaho at 125. Here, there was no close temporal
relationship to satisfy element 3. The felony malicious harassment and misdemeanor battery
charges occurred on September 4, 2018, in Nez Perce County. (State’s Ex. 3, pp.3–5.) The judge
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issued a bench warrant for Mr. Clark’s failure to appear at a preliminary conference for these
charges on November 20, 2018. (State’s Ex. 3, p.1.) The Nez Perce sheriff’s office received the
warrant on November 21, 2018. (State’s Ex. 3, p.1.) Officer Graham and Officer Drew pursued
Mr. Clark on January 9, 2019, and Officer Graham served the warrant on Mr. Clark on that day.
(State’s Ex. 3, p.1; see Tr. Vol. II, p.31, L.6–p.32, L.6, p.34, Ls.7–23, p.79, L.16–p.80, L.18,
p.81, L.12–p.82, L.11, p.87, Ls.2–15.) In short, the officers’ apprehension of Mr. Clark occurred
months after his commission of the Nez Perce County offenses and the issuance of the bench
warrant. There was not a close temporal relationship. Therefore, the State presented insufficient
evidence for the district court to find common law fresh pursuit.
Second, the State’s evidence failed to meet the second part of the fresh pursuit definition:
“the pursuit of a person who has committed a felony or who is reasonably suspected of having
committed a felony.” I.C. § 19-705. As discussed in Parts C.1 and C.2, this statutory term
excludes pursuit to execute an arrest warrant. That was the sole basis for the officers’ pursuit
here. The State presented no evidence on Mr. Clark’s connection to the supposed robbery, and,
in fact, the district court rejected the State’s position that the officers were delayed in their
“purported” robbery investigation by Mr. Clark’s flight. (Tr. Vol. II, p.126, L.23–p.127, L.2.)
There was no evidence that Officer Drew and Officer Graham reasonably suspected Mr. Clark of
committing a felony at the time of their pursuit. Therefore, the State presented insufficient
evidence for the district court to find the “committed a felony” part of the fresh pursuit
definition.
Due to the insufficiency of the evidence for “fresh pursuit,” the State failed to meet its
burden to prove the elements of unlawful entry during fresh pursuit beyond a reasonable doubt.
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The district court erred by finding Mr. Clark guilty of two counts of felony unlawful entry, and
this Court should vacate his judgment of conviction.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Clark respectfully requests this Court vacate his judgment of conviction for two
counts of felony unlawful entry and remand this case to the district court for further
proceedings.
DATED this 17th day of March, 2020.
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